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How is the effectiveness of surface combatant ships in a Major Theater War
measured? While Measures of Effectiveness for an individual ship can include its
number of missiles, speed, and endurance, it is difficult to find a Measure of
Effectiveness credible to experienced warplanners for a fleet of ships.
The performance ofNavy ships in a major war is a critical issue. United States
strategic policy is based on its ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous Major
Theater Wars. Force requirements for the Navy are determined by the estimated mix of
ships necessary to win these wars. One surface combatant costs in excess of 500 million
dollars: with average ship lifespans in excess of 30 years, a flawed ship mix can be costly
and difficult to correct. A credible way to forecast the performance of ships in a Major
Theater War would result in a more robust fleet and could save billions of dollars.
The Fleet Effectiveness Model (FEFM) provides decision-makers with a tool to
measure the performance of surface combatants in a Major Theater War. FEFM not only
measures the performance of a fleet of ships but also illustrates how surface combatant
mission capabilities affect fleet performance. It also verifies the strong relationship
between logistics support and fleet effectiveness. Most importantly, it allows planners to
address the many "what if scenarios concerning fleet composition.
Acquiring and designing ships will always be an expensive process. FEFM
demonstrates that mathematical programming can help measure fleet effectiveness and




How is the effectiveness of surface combatant ships in a Major Theater War
(MTW) measured? While Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for an individual ship can
include its number of missiles, speed, and endurance, it is difficult to find a Measure of
Effectiveness credible to experienced warplanners for a fleet of ships.
The performance ofNavy ships in a major war is a critical issue. United States
strategic policy is based on its ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous Major
Theater Wars. Force requirements for the Navy are determined by the estimated mix of
ships necessary to win these wars. One surface combatant costs in excess of 500 million
dollars: with average ship lifespans in excess of 30 years, a flawed ship mix can be costly
and difficult to overcome. An accurate way to forecast the performance of ships in a
Major Theater War would result in a more robust fleet and could save billions of dollars.
Figure 1 illustrates the Fleet Effectiveness Problem.
This thesis develops a Fleet Measure of Effectiveness (FMOE) to forecast the
success of surface combatants in a Major Theater War (MTW). FMOE can then be used
to compare the capabilities of various fleets of ships. It also is used to examine a number
of issues including the impact logistics has on fleet effectiveness. Before describing
FMOE, it is necessary to define the elements of a MTW. The remainder of this chapter
describes the Major Theater War scenario for the Far East in 2015 based on the results of
a study conducted by the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) at The Johns Hopkins
University.
Figure 1. The Fleet Effectiveness Problem. We seek a method to measure the
effectiveness of ships participating in a Major Theater War (MTW) in the Far East. The
question is: how many ships of what classes are needed to collectively win the war?
A. PRECEDING WORK
1. Surface Combatant Force Level Study Discussion
In 1998 the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) at The Johns Hopkins University
was tasked by the Director, Surface Warfare Division (N-86) to conduct a Surface
Combatant Force Level Study II (SCFLS II) (Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren,
1998). The study determines the optimal mix of Aegis cruisers (CG-52), Aegis guided
missile destroyers (DDG-51), and the new destroyers (DD-21) to satisfy national
objectives from 2010-2020. Total warfighting surface combatant force requirements will
be derived by an examination of the missions combatants would be tasked in a Major
Theater War originating in the Far East about the year 2015.
APL is conducting the study in four phases. First, analysts from APL have met
with N-86 and the Office ofNaval Intelligence (ONI) to create a scenario that will be
realistic, conform to U.S. national objectives, and challenge the flexibility of naval
forces. APL created a joint wargame to identify the missions that would be conducted by
surface combatants for the year 2015 (Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, 1999a).
Based on the surface combatant tasks identified in the joint wargame, an analysis will be
conducted to determine the sufficient numbers and types of ships required for each
mission. Finally, the total force requirement will be identified based on the sufficiency
analysis, transit time for ships to arrive in theater, and assumed allied ship contributions.
In late April, 1999, representatives from the Chief ofNaval Operations, Naval
Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD), Center for Naval Analysis
(CNA) and senior representatives from OPNAV conducted a joint wargame for the Far
East Major Theater War (Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, 1999b). They have
identified the missions that surface combatants will be assigned. For instance, the joint
wargame determined by group consensus the approximate number of ships required for
Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) during the last week of the war. Applied Physics
Laboratory is using the results of this seminar to conduct a sufficiency analysis and
determine final force requirements. The completion date for Surface Combatant Force
Level Study II is December 1999.
2. Mission Descriptions
The wargame has identified five primary missions for surface combatants in the
future (Naval Surface Warfare Center, 1999b). Figure 2 displays two of the five missions
defined in Table 1
.
Figure 2. Surface Combatant Missions. Surface ships in 2015 will pertorm missions
ranging from classical Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) shown on the left to entirely
new Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD), on the right. Present-day missions
Theater Air Defense (TAD), Undersea Warfare (USW), and Escort will remain important
in the future.
MISSION PURPOSE
Naval Surface Fire Support
(NSFS)
Enables freedom of maneuver by joint and
combined ground forces and successful prosecution
of the joint land battle
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
(TBMD)
Permits forward-deployed U.S. and coalition forces




Allows U.S. and coalition forces freedom of action








Enables amphibious and logistics forces to operate
in the theater
Table 1. Description of Missions. These are the five missions for the Far-East Major
Theater War scenario.
3. Wargame Scenario
The Major Theater War (MTW) scenario for Surface Combatant Force Level
Study II occurs in 20 1 5 as the Korean Peninsula is attacked by another power (Naval
Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, 1999c). The conflict lasts approximately 100 days. It
is separated into four distinct phases: DETER, DEFEND, BUILDUP, and COUNTER-
OFFENSIVE. These phases are defined in Table 2. Minimum and maximum ship
requirements are established for each mission per phase. In order to fight the war, all
minimum requirements must be satisfied. Conversely, once maximum ship requirements
are met, additional ships will not enhance mission accomplishment. The number of ships
required per mission is based on the most capable ship class for the mission and assumes
100 percent ship availability. For example, in the build-up phase, a minimum of five
CG's is necessary for the entire phase. However, more that eight CG's will not enhance
mission effectiveness. The assignment of less capable classes of ships and replenishment
requirements will reduce mission effectiveness. These degradations will be addressed in
Chapter II.
DETER U.S. and coalition forces attempt to deter enemy from
attacking
DEFEND U.S. and coalition forces slow the enemy ground advance
BUILDUP U.S. and coalition ground forces arrive in theater while
naval and air forces establish battlespace dominance
COUNTEROFFENSIVE U.S. and coalition forces retake areas occupied by enemy
ground forces
Table 2. Phases of the Far East Major Theater War.
B. THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter II defines Fleet Measure of Effectiveness (FMOE) and explains the
elements that contribute to its calculation. Chapter III reviews relevant literature,
discusses the methodology by which FMOE is calculated, and explains why a distribution
for FMOE is preferable to a point estimate. Chapter IV applies this methodology to
several case studies. Finally, Chapter V discusses conclusions and recommendations
resulting from this study.
II. FLEET MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
Fleet Measure of Effectiveness (FMOE) is defined as the probability that a fleet
will win the war. For instance, a FMOE of .5 indicates that the given mix of surface
combatants will have a 50 percent chance of defeating the enemy. Equation (1) defines
the components of FMOE.
FMOE =£ PHASE WEIGHTp * MISSION IMPORTANCE ™, P * MISSION EFFECTIVENESS™. P (1
)
m. p
where m indexes the missions (TBMD, NSFS, TAD, ESCORT, USW)(Table 1), p
indexes the phases of the war (DETER, DEFEND, BUILD-UP, and COUNTER-
OFFENSIVE) (Table 2), and the remaining terms are defined in this section.
A. PHASE WEIGHTS
Herein, the weight of each phase is proportional to the length of the phase. For
example, the weight of phase DEFEND equals .20 (length of phase, 20 days, divided by
length of war, 100 days).
B. MISSION IMPORTANCE
Surface combatants in this future MTW will perform five primary missions.
However, these missions are not of equal importance. Individual mission importance
also varies by phase of the war. For instance, decision-makers all stressed during the
joint wargame that Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) is a much more critical mission
than Undersea Warfare (USW) in phase COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. Expert opinion is
needed to assess the importance of each mission for all phases of the campaign. The
remainder of this section shows how to use decision-maker input to quantify the
importance of these five missions for each phase.
1. The Analytic Hierarchy Process
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1990) is a decision-making tool
that can be used to quantify the importance of each mission. For each phase of the war,
decision-makers select the more important mission from each pair of missions. They also
specify the magnitude of the difference of each pair of missions by assigning a ratio that
ranges from one (equally important) to nine (extreme difference). This allows the
decision-makers to express the strength of their opinions. The pairwise comparisons are
then used to derive a set of weights that quantify the relative importance of each mission
(mission weights). See Saaty, 1990 for a complete description of the AHP process.
2. Mission Importance Survey
Expert military judgment is critical to estimate the importance of these missions.
A mission importance survey form (Appendix A) is used to solicit these pairwise
comparisons from the senior military leaders who participated in the joint wargame
(Naval Surface Warfare Center, 1999b). The survey participants are from all four
branches of the military and the United States Coast Guard. All fifteen respondents are
field grade officers (05 and above) who have served tours in operational billets. Most
have extensive experience with wargaming and strategic planning.
For every phase, an AHP weight is determined for each mission. The AHP
weights for each decision-maker sum to one for the missions in each phase. The final
product for each phase is fifteen separate sets of weights assessing the importance of
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these missions. Each set of weights corresponds to the opinion of each survey
participant. When faced with AHP weights from several sources, a common approach
(e.g., Saaty, 1990) is to combine them by averaging. In this application, averaging would
lose important differences in expert opinion. To capture these differences, we treat the 1
5
sets of weights as samples from a large population, and estimate probability distributions
for mission importance by phase of war. The next chapter will discuss how these
distributions of mission weights are estimated. Draws from these distributions give the
mission weights used in the calculation ofFMOE, as given in Equation (1). Chapter II
explains how the variability in expert opinion and hence mission weights drives the
variability of Fleet Measure of Effectiveness (FMOE) for a fixed mix of surface
combatants.
C. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS
Mission effectiveness is a function of three things: 1) capability of ships assigned
(class capability), 2) logistics requirements for the ships (degradation due to activity
necessary for replenishment), and 3) interaction between ships assigned and mission
effectiveness (synergism) for the ships performing this mission.
1. Class Capability
Requirements for each mission are in terms of ideal ships. An ideal ship belongs
to the ship class most capable for that mission. For instance, cruisers (CG-52) are the
ideal ship class for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD). However, with a fixed
fleet size, less than ideal ships may be required to perform missions. In particular,
although the DDG class can hold only 91 missiles compared to a maximum of 122 for the
CG class, it still can perform TBMD. The TBMD mission capability of a DDG relative
to a CG must be quantified.
Using the conclusions of the wargame, the degradation in mission performance by
using the less capable ship class can be estimated. For example, the class capability
weight for a DDG performing Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) is .5. In other words,




Surface combatants can not remain on station continuously during the
MTW. They must receive food, fuel, and ammunition periodically. Replenishment
denotes the resupply of ships either at sea or in port.
Inport replenishment requires a ship leave station and return to port for
supplies. Conversely, at-sea replenishment allows the ship to remain underway and
receive goods alongside from a supply ship (Figure 3), albeit at some distance from
station.
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Figure 3. A CG (USS Philippine Sea) Receives Fuel From a Fleet Oiler (AO).
Surface combatants participating in replenishment are unable to simultaneously perform
their primary mission, and the replenishment may take place at some distance from the
combatant's mission station.
To conduct at-sea replenishment, the combatant ship (CG, DDG, and DD)
leaves station to rendezvous with the supply ship; or the supply ship travels to replenish
the combatant on station, a possibly dangerous tactic.
The need to periodically replenish reduces the on-station time for the
surface combatant. For instance, if a CG must go off-station for 12 hours to receive fuel
from an oiler (Figure 3), the ship may be unable to perform its primary mission. It is
inconvenient to simultaneously transfer fuel or ammunition and fire missiles. Therefore,
a ship replenishing cannot perform its primary mission.
b. Ship Endurance and Replenishment Times
The time a ship can perform an assigned mission without replenishment
defines its endurance. A ship always expends fuel and food. In a Major Theater War
(MTW), a ship also expends ammunition and missiles at a rapid rate. When a ship runs
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out of food, fuel, or munitions, it must replenish. Due to the high tempo of combat
operations in this scenario, the ships will run out of munitions before food or fuel.
Replenishment time estimates the time a ship is off station for resupply.
The quantities and types of commodities desired by the surface ship will determine
replenishment time. Most importantly, ships in this Major Theater War will fire
hundreds of missiles. These missiles are placed into Vertical Launch canisters on the
ships. Unfortunately, these canisters cannot be loaded at sea. For this scenario, the
nearest port safe for loading is in Japan. This will require surface ships performing
missions near the Korean peninsula to sail for at least one day just to reach the port and
another day to return to their station. Reloading a ship with missiles can be done in a
minimum of 12 hours. The ships can minimize off-station time by receiving fuel and
food either inport during missile loading or during their transit to and from the port. It
will still take a minimum of three days to replenish ships performing TBMD and
TAD with food, fuel, and missiles. Figure 4 illustrates the replenishment procedure for
ships performing Theater Ballistic Missile Defense and Theater Air Defense.
Conversely, ships performing NSFS can replenish ammunition at sea in
approximately 12 hours. However, their land attack missiles must be replenished in port.
Based on this limitation and the scarcity of land attack missiles, the ships will replenish
ammunition frequently. Land attack missile resupply will be rare and may not occur
during the war (Lindemann, 1 999).
Although the CG class has 122 missile cells compared to 91 for the DDG
class, the difference in reload time is only a few hours. The two-day time off-station
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required for transit dominates the difference in reload time between classes: class
differences for ships are only a minor factor for computing replenishment times.
Due to heavy expenditure of missiles and ammunition during the MTW,
replenishment times are a generally a function of the time off-station to receive
ammunition and missiles. Using expert judgments from the wargame, replenishment
times for each mission and geographic location have been estimated.
c. Replenishment Factor
The replenishment factor is the fraction of time a ship is available to
perform its mission if replenishment requirements are considered: ship endurance divided
by the sum of ship endurance and replenishment time. The lower the replenishment
factor, the more often a ship has to replenish. For instance, a replenishment factor of .80
indicates that ship spends 20 percent of its time off-station in support of replenishment.
Table 3 details the replenishment factor for TBMD by location.
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Japanese port
Figure 4. Logistics Concept of Operations for Missile Replenishment. Ships that
require missile rearming must travel from their assigned station to a port in Japan for
reloading. This will take an average of 30 hours to transit from assigned station to the
port facility. In addition, rearming missiles inport will require another 12 hours.
Although the ship can receive food and fuel from a replenishment ship during transit
from the theater to the port facility, a ship will be off-station for approximately 72
hours.
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Eastern Sea of Japan
THEATER
BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSE 10 3.5 .74
Northern Sea of
Japan
Table 3. Replenishment "actors for Mission Theater Ballistic Missile Defense by location.
Ships operating in the Yellow Sea are farther from ports in Japan and are thus off-station
longer for replenishment. The mission areas closer to Japanese ports have higher
replenishment factors.
3. Effective Ships
When a ship is assigned a mission, its performance is degraded by the replenish-
ment factor. Class capabilities less than one also can reduce mission effectiveness. An
effective ship represents the residual military value of a ship when replenishment and
class capability are considered. Figure 5 illustrates this concept.
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A DDG is assigned TBMD Class







Figure 5. Description of an Effective Ship. A guided missile destroyer (DDG) is
assigned to perform Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD). Its class capability is .8
relative to the ideal ship class (cruiser) required for TBMD. A ship assigned TBMD in
the Northern Sea of Japan can only remain on-station 74 percent of the time due to
replenishment requirements. Therefore, a DDG assigned to TBMD is equivalent to .60
cruiser (CG) performing TBMD continuously.
4. Relationship Between Effective Ships and Mission Effectiveness
The likelihood that each mission can be accomplished is based on the number of
effective ships assigned, but it is not a linear relationship. Ships perform missions with
synergistic effects. Figure 6 motivates this concept. For example, mission effectiveness
for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) in phase DEFEND is zero until a
minimum of six effective ships is assigned. Once six effective ships are assigned,
effectiveness increases to fifty percent. The rate of increase of mission effectiveness per
ship declines after minimum requirements are met. Nevertheless, total mission
effectiveness continues to increase and reaches 1 00 percent when fifteen or more ships
that are effective are assigned. Figure 7 illustrates the S-shaped curve for mission
effectiveness for TBMD in phase DEFEND.
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Figure 6. Surface Combatants Perform Missions Collaboratively and Synergistically.
The intense missions assigned to surface combatants in the future will require close
coordination between surface, subsurface, and air units. Most significantly, one ship
operating alone cannot achieve mission success. Ships will be required to work in
concert to achieve missions. Multiple ships will be necessary and mission effectiveness is
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Figure 7. Mission Effectiveness as A Function of Effective Ships Assigned. This
graph demonstrates the S curve relationship between mission effectiveness and
effective ships assigned for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense in the DEFEND phase.
At least 6 effective ships are required to achieve minimum requirements. Mission
effectiveness increases rapidly as additional ships are added and reaches .9 once 12
effective ships are assigned. Additional ships only marginally improve effectiveness.
No benefit is attained by adding ships at the SATURATED level.
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Fleet Measure of Effectiveness (FMOE) is the probability of winning the war. It
is a function of several components including phase weight, mission importance, and the
effectiveness of a given set of ship assignments to each of the missions. Human
judgment is critical in the assessment of the importance of each mission to the eventual
outcome of the war. Due to the sometimes-conflicting opinions of multiple decision-
makers, the synthesis of expert opinion into a likely distribution for the importance of
each mission for each phase is more informative than using an average value. Figure 8
presents a histogram of the importance of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) in
the phase COUNTER-OFFENSIVE based on the results of the Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP) survey (Appendix A) conducted during the joint wargame (Naval Surface




Figure 8. The Histogram of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Weights in the Phase
COUNTER-OFFENSIVE.
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By treating mission importance weights as random, FMOE for a given fleet of
ships also becomes random with a distribution. Figure 9 illustrates such a possible
distribution. This distribution reflects the variability in expert opinion and the uncertainty










Figure 9. The Notional Distribution ofFMOE for a Fleet of 17 CG's, 37 DDG's, and 12
DD's
A. LITERATURE DISCUSSION
This analysis draws on three ideas that have already appeared in the published
literature. The first idea is to use distributions instead of average values when combining
individual judgments into a group model. As discussed in Chapter II, Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP) can be used to quantify the importance of missions in each phase. Saaty
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(1982 and 1990) recommends geometric means to combine the priorities of multiple
judges. For this scenario, we would calculate geometric mean values for the mission
weights from the 15 decision-makers during all phases of the conflict. However, mean
values do not capture the conflicting judgments of decision-makers. Hauser and
Todikmalla (1996) state that point estimates are inappropriate for scenarios where the
decision-makers cannot reach consensus.
In addition, the importance of missions in a war is difficult to quantify with a
point estimate. A mean value is inappropriate for this scenario because it is impossible to
predict exactly how the war will progress. However, a distribution based on the input of
decision-makers ensures that FMOE will capture some of this variability. By sampling
multiple times for the mission importance weights, a distribution ofFMOE based on
optimal use of a given fleet is created. This procedure will capture the uncertainty
associated with large-scale combat. For example, Basak (1998) shows that AHP
distributions provide a stochastic insight into decision-maker preferences.
The next concept is the integration of expert judgments into an optimization
model. For example, Korhonen and Wallenius (1990) use this approach to calculate an
optimal marketing strategy for a Finnish software company. Saaty (1982) also combines
expert judgments and uses linear programming to maximize energy allocation to
industries.
The final idea is to integrate simulation with optimization when some of the
underlying parameters of the optimization are stochastic. Optimization combined with
limited simulation has been documented in the literature as a method to solve stochastic
21
problems. For example, Jordan and Graves (1995) optimize manufacturing of
automobile parts when the demands are stochastic and Shang and Sueyoshi (1995) select
the most efficient manufacturing system using AHP, optimization, and simulation.
B. METHODOLOGY
This analysis develops an estimate ofFMOE for a fixed fleet by integrating
subjective expert opinion with analytical tools including optimization and simulation.
1. Development of Mission Importance Distributions
For each phase of the war AHP mission weights range between and 1 and sum
to 1 . These weights differ from phase to phase and among experts. To capture
differences in weights between phases and variability among experts, we model the five
AHP mission weights Yh . . .,Y5 corresponding to TBMD, NSFS, USW, TAD, and
ESCORT, respectively, for each phase as positive random variables that sum to one. A
reasonable model for the joint distribution of Yi,...,Ys is the Dirichlet distribution
(Johnson and Kotz, 1972) with parameters cci,...,a.5. This distribution is a multivariate
generalization of the Beta distribution. It is often used to model non-negative random
vectors whose elements sum to one (Basak, 1998) as is the case with the AHP mission
weights whose sum in each phase equals one. This distribution is used to summarize the
opinions of the fifteen experts surveyed during the wargame.
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Equation (2) shows the joint density function for the random variables Yi,. . .,Y5
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In order to check that the Dirichlet distribution is a reasonable model for AHP
weights, the marginal, empirical distribution of mission weights for each phase are
compared to 1 5 randomly generated observations from a Beta distribution. The
parameters for Beta distributions are estimated using the method of moments (Devore,
1995, p. 265). For example, Figure (10) compares the Beta probability plots of the 15
NSFS weights in phase BUILD-UP to three probability plots derived from random
observations of a Beta (1.76, 6.47) distribution. Because plots of the three random
samples for the Beta distribution and the plot of the NSFS weights appear
interchangeable, it is sensible to model the NSFS weights for this phase by a Beta
distribution. Similar plots for the mission weights for each phase also confirm that
23
marginals can be modeled by a Beta and hence a Dirichlet distribution is a sensible
choice for the joint distribution of mission weights.
The next step is to estimate cti,. . .,a 5 for each phase. An algorithm similar to the
one of Johnson and Kotz (1972, p. 231) approximates the maximum likelihood estimators
(MLE's) for cti,. . .,015. The algorithm is given in Appendix B. Table 4 lists the MLE's of
a.\,...,OL5 for each phase.
NSPSCoefficwnts RandomBeta
Figure 10. Beta Probability Plots. The graph in the upper left corner gives Beta
probability plots for the NSFS weights in phase BUILDUP derived from the decision-
makers who completed the mission importance survey (Appendix A). For comparison,
three additional Beta probability plots are included, each of 15 randomly generated
observations from a Beta (1.76, 6.47). Because these plots appear similar, the Beta












DETER 2.99 1.57 2.10 2.61 1.29
DEFEND 3.67 1.94 2.36 3.07 1.72
BUILDUP 4.01 2.78 2.11 2.69 1.88
COUNTER-OFFENSIVE 8.99 11.77 3.90 6.15 2.73
Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimators of cti,. . .,as by phase for all missions in
the Major Theater War (MTW).
The MLE's for expected AHP weights are found by substituting the MLE's for
the a' s into Equation (3). These AHP weights are shown in Table 5. From those
weights, as the war proceeds, the importance ofNSFS increases at the expense ofUSW
and ESCORT. Decision-makers judge that U.S. and coalition forces will have achieved
battlespace dominance by phase COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. This will allow American
forces to launch extensive NSFS attacks against the enemy.
PHASE TBMD NSFS USW TAD ESCORT
DETER .28 .15 .20 .25 .12
DEFEND .29 .15 .18 .24 .14
BUILDUP .30 .20 .16 .20 .14
COUNTER-OFFENSIVE .27 .35 .12 .18 .08
Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Estimators of the AHP Weights by phase for all
missions in the MTW
The parametric bootstrap (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) assesses the accuracy of
the MLE's. For each of the four Dirichlet distributions, one thousand bootstrap samples
of size 15 are generated by sampling from the estimated Dirichlet distribution. For each
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bootstrap sample, MLE's are computed for the a's. The code for the parametric
bootstrap is given in Appendix B. To estimate the bias of the MLE's, Table 6 shows the











DETER 3.55 1.84 2.49 3.10 1.54
DEFEND 4.25 2.23 2.74 3.54 2.01
BUILDUP 4.64 3.22 2.45 3.11 2.18
COUNTER-OFFENSIVE 10.29 13.52 4.43 7.01 3.11
Table 6. The Mean a's Generated from 1000 Bootstrap Samples. The MLE's
generated by the bootstrap methods are approximately 25 percent higher than the
MLE's approximated by the Johnson and Kotz algorithm (Table 5).
Comparing Table 4 and Table 6 reveals that the MLE's are biased and that they
tend to overestimate the a's. From Equation (4), we see that this causes the variability of
the AHP weights to be underestimated.
However, the MLE's for the expected AHP weights are relatively unbiased. The
average of the expected AHP weights estimated from the bootstrap samples are given in
Table 7. These weights are close to the estimated expected AHP weights from the
original data (Table 5). In particular, Table 4 (expected AHP weights) and Table 6
(bootstrap generated AHP weights) appear interchangeable to the casual observer. The
standard errors of the MLE's of the expected weights are detailed in Table 8. Notice that
standard errors are all less than .032.
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PHASE TBMD NSFS USW TAD ESCORT
DETER .28 .15 .20 .25 .12
DEFEND .29 .15 .19 .24 .13
BUILD-UP .30 .20 .16 .20 .14
COUNTER-OFFENSIVE .27 .35 .12 .18 .08
Table 7. AHP Weights for all missions in the MTW generated from the bootstrap
samples. These results are almost identical to the AHP weights generated by the
Johnson and Kotz algorithm (Johnson and Kotz, 1972, p. 231).
PHASE TBMD NSFS USW TAD ESCORT
DETER .033 .023 .027 .030 .022
DEFEND .031 .023 .026 .027 .022
BUILDUP .030 .027 .023 .025 .022
COUNTER-OFFENSIVE .020 .021 .014 .016 .012
Table 8. Standard Errors (SE) for the MLE's of the Expected Weights. This
indicates that the MLE's for the expected AHP weights are relatively unbiased.
Although the Dirichlet distribution approximation is based on the input ofjust 15
decision-makers, the estimates of the expected AHP weights are very accurate. However,
the MLE's for the a's may underestimate the variability of the AHP weights. The
consequence is that the final weights may exhibit less variability than they should. The
standard errors for MLE's of the expected weights are small enough to insure that the
results of the analysis are reasonable.
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2. Optimization Model
Although the mission importance weights are stochastic, the optimization model
calculates FMOE for a fixed realization from the mission weights distributions. By
solving the optimization multiple times, each with a different realization from the mission
weights, a distribution ofFMOE is developed. The remainder of this section details the
mathematical formulation and shows how the S curve for mission effectiveness (Figure
7) is approximated by binary and continuous variables (Figure 11).
a. Conceptual Model Description
The Fleet Effectiveness Model (FEFM) assigns ships to missions to
maximize their effectiveness over the entire war.
MAXIMIZE:
Fleet Measure of Effectiveness
Subject to:
Each ship can perform only one mission per phase.
Replenishment requirements and class capabilities degrade effectiveness
of ships.
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Figure 11. Computation of Mission Effectiveness. The piecewise linear function
for mission effectiveness (see Figure 7) is calculated using binary and continuous
variables. This figure illustrates how mission effectiveness is calculated if 8







ships (name of ship)
class of ship (CG, DDG, DD)
missions (TBMD, NSFS, TAD, ESCORT, USW)
phase (DETER, DEFEND, BUILDUP,
COUNTEROFFENSIVE)




g geographic area (EAST, WEST, NORTH)
Note: missions may be conducted in more than one area e.g.
TBMD-NORTH
classcapcr The capability of a ship in class c to perform
mission m (ranges between and 1)
replenFactorn Percentage of time a ship can perform mission m
in geographic region g due to logistics











Minimum number of ships required for mission
m at level e during phase p for geographic
location g (effective ships)
The mission effectiveness intercept for mission
m at effectiveness level e during phase p at
geographic location g (see Figure 11)
The increase in mission effectiveness obtained
by adding another effective ship at level e for
mission m during phase p at geographic location
g (see Figure 11)
Analytic Hierarchy Process based mission
weights for mission m at phase p (ranges
between and 1
)
The weight of each mission m at each
geographic location g (ranges between and 1
)
The weight of each phase p
(Days in each phase divided by days in war)
= 1 if ship s is assigned mission m during phase
p for geographic area g. It is understood that
not all combinations of subscripts are possible.
= otherwise
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MINMETm,e,p,g = 1 if minimum ship requirements for mission
m at level e during phase p at geographic
location g are met
= otherwise
MISSIONEFFm,P,g the mission effectiveness for each mission m
and during each phase p at geographic location
g
FMOE fleet measure of effectiveness. The percentage
of all weighted missions completed during the
war.
ESHIPS m,e,p,g number of effective ships for each mission m at
level e during phase p at geographic location g
FORMULATION
Maximize objective function




J] classcaps, m * replenFactorm, g * ASSIGN*, m, P , g =V ESHIPSm, e , P , g V m, p, g (6)
s e
£ (intmeffm, e p g * MINMETV e , P , g + plusmeffm, e . P, g • ESHIPSm, e, P , g) = MISSIONEFFm, P , g V m, p, g (7)
e
£ ASSIGNs, m, P , g= IV s,p (8)
m,g
minships it, e, P , g * MINMETm, e, P , g < ESfflPSm, e, P , g V m,e **INEFFECTIVE', p,g (9)
minshipsm, e + i, P,g-MINMETm,e, P ,g>ESfflPSm,e, P,gV m,e*'SATURATED',p,g (10)
^MINMETm,e, P, g = l V m,p,g (11)
e
ASSIGNs,m,p, g e{0,l} V s,m,p,g (12)
MINMETm,e, P ,gG {0,1} V m,e,p,g
ESfflPSm,e. P,g>0V m,e,p,g (13)
MISSIONEFFm, P,g> V m,p,g
Equation (5) represents the computation ofFMOE. Equation (6) calculates
effective ships for each mission and phase. Equation (7) computes the effectiveness of
each mission for each phase (see Figure 1 1). Equation (8) ensures that each ship is
assigned to only one mission per phase. Equations (9) and (10) ensure that levels of
mission effectiveness are attained only if enough effective ships are assigned. Equation
(11) ensures only one level of effectiveness per mission and phase. Specifications (12)
require binary decisions are made for ship assignment and determination of mission
effectiveness levels. Specifications (13) ensure FMOE, effective ships, and mission
effectiveness are positive variables.
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3. Expected Value Analysis
Saaty (1982 and 1990) recommends geometric means to combine the priorities of
decision-makers. Figure 12 shows the Fleet Measure of Effectiveness (FMOE) results for a
fleet of 17 CG's, 37 DDG's, and 12 DD's using both the Dirichlet distribution and the
geometric mean for mission weights. The FMOE point estimate generated from the geometric
mean for mission weights is close to the arithmetic mean of the FMOE distribution derived
from the Dirichlet distribution of mission weights. However, the FMOE distribution displays
















082 083 0.84 0.85 086 0.87
FMOE
088
Figure 12. A distribution ofFMOE expresses the uncertainty associated with measuring
fleet effectiveness. A point estimate using the geometric mean for mission weights does
not display this variability.
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4. Integration of Distributions with the Optimization Model
Figure 13 shows how a distribution ofFMOE is calculated. First, a specific fleet
mix is designated. A sample of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) mission weights are
drawn from the Dirichlet distribution associated with each phase. A total of 20 mission
weights (5 missions by 4 phases) is generated for each sample. The optimization model
is then run with these weights and solves for FMOE. Another set of 20 mission
importance weights is sampled from the Dirichlet distributions until 40 complete samples
are drawn. FMOE is calculated for each sample of mission importance weights. The final
product is 40-observations ofFMOE for a given fleet.
SPECIFY FLEET
COMPOSITION n=0
DRAW ONE SAMPLE OF








Figure 13. This diagram illustrates the process of computing Fleet Measure of
Effectiveness (FMOE) 40 times for a fixed fleet of ships.
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IV. CASE STUDIES AM) RESULTS
This chapter will show how FEFM can aid in the design of an effective mix of
surface combatants. In particular, case studies show how the composition of ships
participating in the war (ship mix), logistics support, and the mission capability of each
ship class contribute to overall fleet effectiveness
Fleet Effectiveness Model (FEFM) is implemented in the General .Algebraic
Modeling System (Brooke. Kendrick. Meeraus. and Raman,. 1997). FEFM is solved
using CPLEX 6.5 with Gams Version 2.50 r Distribution 18.1 (CPLEX Optimization. Inc.
1999). Results are guaranteed to be within 2 percent of optimal ity.
A. COMPARISON OF SHIP MLXES
Although FMOE increases with each additional surface combatant, the correct
mix of ships from each of the three classes (CG. DDG. and DD ) is critical to success in a
war. Figure 14 motivates this concept. FMOE for each fleet size is optimized forty times
using random sets of mission weights drawn from the Dirichlet distributions for each
phase (Figure 13). Each fleet mix uses the same fcrty sets : : miss: : - weights. 3 : th
fleets have 66 ships but the mix identified by the Surface Combatant Force Le-. e. Study n
(SCFLS II) is clearly superior.
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Comparison of 66 Ship Mixes
Ineffective Mix
7 CG 27 DDG 32 DD
Mean .76
SCFLS II Mix
17 CG 37 DDG 12 DD
Mean .86
0.7 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.8 0.82 84 0.86 O.f
FMOE
Figure 14. Comparison of ship mix distributions. The ship mix (17 CG 37 DDG 12 DD)
proposed by the Surface Combatant Force Level Study II (SCFLS II) is superior to most
66-ship mixes. It is clearly superior to the "ineffective" 66-ship mix (7 CG 27 DDG 32
DD).
B. LOGISTICS IMPACT ON FMOE
The proper number and mix of surface combatants does not guarantee success in a
Major Theater War. As discussed in Chapter II, surface combatants performing Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) and Theater Air Defense (TAD) must reload missiles
in Japanese ports. Ships will be off-station a minimum of three days for missile
replenishment. However, ifUS ships can not reload in Japanese ports, they must travel to
Guam for missile replenishment. These ships would be off-station at least seven days.
Figure 1 5 examines the impact that missile replenishment location has on FMOE.
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0.7 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88
FMOE
0.9 0.92 0.94
Figure 15. Logistics impact on Fleet Effectiveness. While all three fleets consist of
17 CG's, 37 DDG's, and 12 DD's, ships that can replenish in Japan are much more
effective than surface combatants that must travel to Guam for missile replenishment.
Conversely, if the ability to perform VLS missile replenishment at sea is developed by
2015, FMOE would increase significantly.
This case study corroborates a key lesson the United States learned during the
Persian Gulf War: forward logistics bases are required to support missile and ammunition
replenishment of naval assets in a MTW (Department of Defense, 1992). More ships
would be required to fight an MTW in the Far East if missile replenishment is not
available in theater. Nevertheless, Figures 1 6 and 1 7 show that even with a significantly
larger fleet it is difficult to compensate for the loss of missile replenishment in theater.
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More ships are required if in-theater missile replenishment is not possible
E3
80-ship fleet









0.8 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.9
FMOE
Figure 16. Poor logistics support will inhibit an otherwise effective fleet of surface
combatants. An 80-ship mix with missile replenishment in Guam is about as effective

























0.78 0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86
17 CG 37 DDG 12 DD in Japan
0.88 0.9
Figure 17. Each point in this figure is a paired observation. The mission weights are
identical, but the fleet mix and replenishment methods are different. If all points lie
beneath the diagonal, the 66-ship fleet (17 CG 37 DDG 12 DD) with missile reload in-
theater would be superior. On the other hand, if all the points are above the diagonal,
the 80-ship fleet (21 CG 44 DDG 15 DD) that conducts missile replenishment in Guam
would be the preferred choice. This is a powerful tool to compare the fleet mixes
because it "corrects" for the randomness in the weights.
The 66-ship fleet appears to be more effective than the 80-ship mix that
replenishes in Guam. Figures 16 and 17 suggest that the 66-ship fleet with
replenishment in Japan is superior. The mean FMOE of the 66-ship mix is 2 percent
higher than the 80-ship fleet (Figure 16). In fact, the test statistic value of the paired t
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test is 20.35 with ap-value of .0001 (Devore, 1995, p. 368). This strongly suggests that
the 66-ship fleet is superior to the 80-ship fleet.
However, even with this evidence it is not correct to conclude that the large fleet
(Guam replenishment) does not compensate for the loss of missile replenishment
capability in theater. Most importantly, FEFM's representation of the MTW is coarse
and is able to effectively discern "large" differences in fleet effectiveness but not
"small" ones.
C. CLASS CAPABILITY COMPARISONS USING FMOE
Fleet Measure of Effectiveness (FMOE) distributions can be used to help
determine mission capabilities for each ship class. As discussed in Chapter II, the class
capability for a DDG performing NSFS is .5. Two DDG 's are needed to match the
mission effectiveness of one DD performing NSFS. Figure 1 8 show that designing the













Figure 18. NSFS capability options for the DDG class. The 66-ship mix identified by
SCFLS II but without NSFS capability for the DDG class is only slightly less effective
than the same ship mix with NSFS capability.
D. FAST COMBATANT OPTION
FMOE distributions also can measure the performance of new classes of ships. In
particular, although the DDG class can perform all five missions, the previous section
shows that the NSFS capability on the DDG does not enhance overall fleet effectiveness
for the Far East Major Theater War. Providing ship classes with multi-mission capability
does not always translate into higher fleet effectiveness.
Rear Admiral (Retired) Worthington (1994) proposes building "Fast Combatant"
class ships. These ships would conduct Escort and Undersea Warfare near the beach and
would allow the DDG class ships to focus on Theater Air Defense and Theater Ballistic
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Missile Defense. Worthington argues against assigning a billion-dollar ship to perform a
mission that can be accomplished by a smaller, cheaper ship class. Figure 19 uses FEFM
to evaluate a fleet of ships with Fast Combatant class ships.





0.84 085 0.86 0.87
17CG37DDG 12 DD
Figure 19. Measuring the Effectiveness of the Fast Combatant (FC) Class. The two
fleets in this case study are indistinguishable as the data points are almost equally
distributed on each side of the center diagonal. Therefore, using 30 DDG's and 7 FC's
instead of 37 DDG's causes no discernible loss of effectiveness. Furthermore, each FC
class ship would cost only a fraction of the price of a DDG (Worthington, 1994).
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V. CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The Fleet Effectiveness Model (FEFM) provides decision-makers with a tool to
measure the performance of surface combatants in a Major Theater War. FEFM not only
measures the performance of a fleet of ships but also illustrates how surface combatant
mission capabilities affect fleet performance. It also verifies the strong relationship
between logistics support and fleet effectiveness. Most importantly, it allows planners to
address the many "what if scenarios concerning fleet composition. By analyzing these
scenarios, FEFM can assist in the design of future surface combatants.
This thesis measures fleet effectiveness for a future MTW in Asia. Further
studies are needed to examine how surface combatants perform in different theaters
versus more (or less) capable enemies. Finally, a detailed comparison between cost data
and FMOE for different ship mixes may help the Navy efficiently utilize every ship
procurement dollar.
B. METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS
FEFM is not a finished product. However, this thesis shows that expert opinion
combined with quantitative Operations Research methods can analyze a difficult
problem: the collective performance of surface ships in a war. This novel approach
employs techniques from decision analysis, statistics, simulation, and optimization. The
Army and the Applied Physics Laboratory at The Johns Hopkins University (JHU/APL)
are considering a similar methodology to analyze the Army force levels necessary to win
smaller-scale conflicts.
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Acquiring and designing ships will always be an expensive process. FEFM
demonstrates that mathematical programming can help measure fleet effectiveness and
therefore aid in the design of a more effective fleet.
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APPENDIX A. MISSION IMPORTANCE SURVEY
Purpose : This survey is designed to collect pairwise comparison data for the primary
missions in the MRC. The missions will be compared for each of the four phases. You
have been briefed on the importance and intent of this survey.






9 EXTREMELY S r
2, 4, 6. and 8 are intermediate values.
Finally, please circle either ADVANTAGE or DISADVANTAGE when completing each
comparison.
Example
TBMD has a ^(adv^ntageTrlisadvantage versus NSFS
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TAD has a advantage/disadvantage versus ESCORT
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APPENDIX B. S-PLUS FUNCTIONS





#This function estimates the approximate MLE using an approximation
#for the MLE of a Beta (Johnson and Kotz) adapted for the Dirichlet
#distribution












#n = size of one sample (n=15)
#B = the number of bootstrap samples of size n (B = a large number)
#alpha = a vector which contains the parameters of the Dirichlet













alpha.boot<-matrix(0, nrow = B, ncol = k)
for(iinl;B)
{
Y<-matrix(rgamma(k*n, shape = alpha), byrow = T, ncol
k)
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